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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNISHING DEADBEAT
PARENTS: THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
OF 1992 AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ
Ronald S. Kornreich
INTRODUCTION
The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA" or the "Act")1
makes the failure to pay a past-due child support obligation for a child
living in another state a federal crime.2 To be subject to prosecution
under the Act, a defendant's failure to pay must be willful and his3
past-due child support obligation must be either greater than $5000 or
have remained unpaid for more than one year.'
The CSRA was enacted in response to a nationwide increase in the
number of deadbeat parents and the particular difficulty custodial par-
ents face in enforcing child support obligations when the noncustodial
parent relocates to a different state.5 Presumably, Congress passed
the CSRA pursuant to its Commerce Clause power to "regulate Com-
merce... among the several States."6 Over time the Supreme Court
has expanded the meaning of this grant of power to Congress and
upheld Commerce Clause legislation dealing with national social and
economic problems.7 The Court has permitted Congress to enact leg-
islation even where the principle purpose of such legislation was not a
commercial or economic one, but a social or moral one."
In April 1995, for the first time in nearly sixty years, the Supreme
Court overturned a federal law as exceeding Congress's Commerce
Clause authority.9 In United States v. Lopez,'0 the Court held uncon-
stitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990," which made the
1. Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (1992) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994)).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a).
3. For reasons of simplicity, this Note will use masculine pronouns to refer to the
noncustodial parent and feminine pronouns to refer to the custodial parent.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), (d)(1)(B).
5. See HL. Rep. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1992) [hereinafter Legislative
History].
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cL 3. The government has defended the Act numerous
times on the grounds that it is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power. See
infra part IV.
7. See 1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Constitutional Law § 4.4. at 371
(2d ed. 1992).
8. See id. §4.8, at 400; infra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
9. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which set maximum-hour and minimum-wage work
requirements in the coal industry); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Kills Law Banning
Guns In A School Zone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
10. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).




possession of a firearm near a school zone a federal crime. 2 The
Court found that the statute was not a valid exercise of Congress's
power pursuant to the Commerce Clause because the possession of a
gun near a school was not a commercial activity and did not substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. 13
Although Lopez did not purport to overrule any previous Com-
merce Clause rulings, the decision calls into question Congress's
power to enact the CSRA pursuant to its commerce power. It may be
argued that because the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress
to prohibit the possession of a gun near a school, it, therefore, does
not empower Congress to make the failure to pay child support a
crime.
Seven courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the CSRA since
the Supreme Court decided Lopez. 4 District courts in Arizona,
Texas, and Pennsylvania have found the CSRA unconstitutional.1 5
Conversely, district courts in Kansas, Virginia, Indiana, and Connecti-
cut have held that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to enact a
federal criminal nonsupport statute. 6
This Note will examine the constitutionality of the CSRA after Lo-
pez. Part I will address the child support enforcement problem, em-
phasizing the difficulties faced by custodial parents in interstate cases.
Part II will introduce the CSRA, determine the situations in which
deadbeat parents are prosecuted under the Act, and examine why the
Act has been used so sparingly. Part III will include a discussion of
Lopez and the relevant Commerce Clause cases that preceded that
decision. Part IV will examine the district court cases that have ruled
on the constitutionality of the CSRA. Finally, part V will distinguish
the CSRA from the Gun-Free School Zones Act and conclude that
Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Lopez is more applicable to an
assessment of the constitutionality of the Act. The commercial nature
of the child support payment obligation and the economic implica-
tions of nonsupport, along with the requirements of the Act and the
legislative history accompanying it, lend support to the conclusion that
the CSRA is a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A); see infra part III.B
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
14. See infra part IV. In addition, the Ninth Circuit denied standing to challenge
the CSRA to a noncustodial parent who resided in the same state as his children; the
parent had not been prosecuted under the Act and did not face a threat of prosecu-
tion. Knight v. United States, No. 93-35604, 1993 WL 501578 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993).
15. See infra part IV.A.
16. See infra part IV.B.
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I. THm CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
More and more children are being raised in single-parent house-
holds.17 Among the factors contributing to this trend are increases in
the number of separations and divorces and the growing rate of out-
of-wedlock births.' 8 As of the spring of 1992, 11.5 million women and
men were single custodial parents of children under the age of twenty-
one.'9 Studies have shown that as many as one in four children lives
with a single mother. 20
The single parent who must provide for her children often depends
on child support payments to supplement whatever she can contribute
on her own or through public assistance programs.21 Child support,
however, frequently is not awarded, 22 and enforcing an award can be
an onerous, if not impossible, task. According to the Bureau of the
Census, nearly one-half of the parents due child support in 1991 did
not receive full payment-of these parents, about one-half received
partial payment while the other half received no payment at all. 3
That same year, $5.8 billion of the $17.7 billion due in child support
went unpaid.24
17. See Paula Roberts, Center for Law and Social Policy, Ending Poverty As We
Know It" The Case for Child Support Enforcement and Assurance 4-5 (1994); U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement: Eighteenth An-
nual Report to Congress 3 (1993) [hereinafter Congressional Report].
18. Congressional Report, supra note 17, at 3. Twenty-one percent of all mar-
riages ended in divorce in 1990, more than double the 9% rate of 1960. Sara McLana-
han & Gary Sandefur, Growing Up With A Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps
138 (1994). Furthermore, in 1991, the number of births to unmarried mothers was at
its highest ever, 1.2 million, which is an increase of 82% from 1980. Congressional
Report, supra note 17, at 4. Births to unmarried women as a proportion of all births
increased from 18% in 1980 to almost 30% in 1991. d
19. Lydia Scoon-Rogers & Gordon H. Lester, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Econ. and
Statistics Admin., Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers: 1991, at 1 (Bu-
reau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P60-187, 1995) [hereinafter
Child Support 1991]. Of the 11.5 million custodial parents, 9.9 million were women
and 1.6 million were men. Id Traditionally, the father had primary responsibility for
the support of his children, with the mother liable in the event that the father did not
provide support. 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States § 7.2, at 435 (2d ed. 1987). Today both mother and father are obligated to
support their children pursuant to state statutes, state judicial decisions, or the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
20. Roberts, supra note 17, at 5.
21. The need for child support payments is illustrated by the discrepancy in pov-
erty rates between single parents and married couples with children. According to
Census data, single mothers and single fathers have poverty rates of 35% and 13%,
respectively, both exceeding the 8% rate for married couples with children. Child
Support 1991, supra note 19, at 1; see infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
22. In 1991, only 6.2 million of the 11.5 million custodial parents were awarded
child support. Child Support 1991, supra note 19, at 1.
23. Id. at 1. In 1991, 5.3 million custodial parents were supposed to receive child
support payments. Of these parents, 1.27 million (23.8%) received only partial pay-
ment, and 1.32 million (24.8%) received no payment at all. Id. at 7.
24. Id at 2.
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Enforcement of the child support obligation is exacerbated when
the custodial parent and the noncustodial parent live in different
states.25 This is an increasingly common phenomenon. Child support
enforcement, which traditionally has been a matter of state law, has
become more nationalized because of the increasing mobility of
American citizens. 26 Noncustodial parents frequently relocate and
find new employment; in fact, among cases handled by government
agencies, the average length of employment for noncustodial parents
is three months.2 7
Estimates indicate that interstate child support cases represent ap-
proximately one-fifth2 (and possibly more than one-third) 29 of all
child support cases in the United States. Yet, according to a report,
less than one of every ten dollars of child support actually collected
nationwide comes from interstate cases.30  Fifty-seven percent of
mothers in interstate cases reported receiving child support payments
occasionally, seldom, or never.31 Only forty-three percent received
payments regularly, compared with sixty percent of mothers in intra-
state cases.32
Whatever the exact figures, clearly the amount of child support that
goes uncollected has social as well as economic implications. Custo-
dial parents and their children must find other means of support to
substitute for the approximately $5 billion that does not reach its in-
tended destination.3 3
25. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 25-28. For example, on average interstate cases
take seven months longer to process than intrastate cases. U.S. Commission on Inter-
state Child Support, "Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform" 3 (1992)
[hereinafter Supporting Our Children].
26. Janelle T. Calhoun, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System:
Juggernaut of Bureaucracy, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 921, 924 (1995). Interstate child sup-
port collections totaled a record $725 million in 1993, an increase of 15.8% over the
previous year and 79% since 1989. Congressional Report, supra note 17, at 71.
27. Calhoun, supra note 26, at 924.
28. Child Support 1991, supra note 19, at 8. According to Census statistics, 66%
of noncustodial parents resided in the same state as their children with whom they did
not live, 19.7% resided in different states, and the remaining 14.2% resided overseas
or at an unknown residence. Id.
29. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAOIHRD-92-39FS, Interstate Child Sup-
port: Mothers Report Receiving Less Support From Out-of-State Fathers 13 (1992)
hereinafter GAO Report].
30. See Congressional Report, supra note 17, at 71. This number, however, may
be overstated. According to a General Accounting Office report, mothers in inter-
state cases received only $2.4 billion of the expected $4.0 billion (60%) in child sup-
port payments. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 16. Mothers in intrastate cases
received $7.0 billion of the $10.0 billion expected (70%). Id.
31. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 15. Thirty-four percent of mothers in inter-
state cases never received support payments in 1989, compared with 19% of mothers
in intrastate cases. Id at 3.
32. Id. at 15.
33. See supra text accompanying note 24.
1092 [Vol. 64
CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
This staggering amount reflects the many obstacles to enforcing an
interstate child support order. The first difficulty is encountered in
civil suits brought against the noncustodial parent by the child or one
suing on the child's behalf.' Frequently in such cases, states do not
have jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 35 The Supreme
Court, in Kulko v. Superior Court,36 held that the mere showing of a
child's presence in the state is not by itself an adequate jurisdictional
basis for a support award in favor of the child against the nonresident
parent.37 The assertion of child support jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant is limited to cases in which the defendant has had sig-
nificant contacts with the forum state. Consequently, delays may
result when contacts to two states obfuscate which state's court has
jurisdiction to enter an order.39
Furthermore, although the custodial parent conceivably could sue
the noncustodial parent in federal court pursuant to diversity of citi-
zenship, federal courts are particularly reluctant to hear domestic rela-
tions cases.4 Federal district courts have jurisdiction to enforce court
orders for child support after approval by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, but this path may be taken only when it has been
found that the nonresident parent's state has failed to enforce the or-
der and that the federal courts provide the only reasonable method
for enforcing the order.41
When long-arm jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is un-
available, the custodial parent and child often rely on the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA"). 42 URESA,
some form of which is available in all states,43 provides a uniform pro-
cess for using the courts of another state without traveling to that state
or becoming subject to jurisdiction in that state." URESA works as
34. See Supporting Our Children, supra note 25, at 78-79.
35. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 14.
36. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
37. Id. at 101; David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 106, at 168 (2d ed. 1991). All
states have long-arm statutes for conferring jurisdiction; in addition, according to the
U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support, about half of the states have specific
long-arm statutes for child support enforcement against a noncustodial parent. Sup-
porting Our Children, supra note 25, at 79. The reach of these long-arm statutes,
however, is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by
Kulko. Id.
38. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92; Supporting Our Children, supra note 25, at 80.
39. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 28.
40. Supporting Our Children, supra note 25, at 79; see also Ankenbrandt v. Rich-
ards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (discussing the validity of a domestic relations excep-
tion to federal jurisdiction). Furthermore, a child support claimant may be unable to
meet the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity cases. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1988).
41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 652(a)(8), 660; 1 Clark, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 440.
42. See 1 Clark, supra note 19, § 18.4, at 406-07.
43. Julieanne Griffin, How To Collect Your Child Support 24 (1995).
44. Id. at 70.
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follows: The custodial parent files a petition in her own state (the
initiating jurisdiction).45 When the court in the initiating jurisdiction
determines that: (1) the absent parent owes child support; and (2) the
court in the absent parent's state has jurisdiction over him or his prop-
erty, the petition is forwarded to the absent parent's state (the re-
sponding jurisdiction).46 If the responding jurisdiction is able to locate
the parent, the court will hold a hearing, after which it will enter a
support order.47
Despite its just aims, in many instances URESA does not work
well.'18 Variations in state laws may result in the responding state's
order not receiving full faith and credit in the courts of the initiating
jurisdiction.49 Moreover, when circumstances change after the initiat-
ing jurisdiction issues its order, the amount of support may be reduced
by the responding jurisdiction.5 0 Finally, a URESA order does not
nullify and is not nullified by another support order; therefore, con-
flicting support orders between the same parties may result.-"
In addition to URESA, the Child Support Enforcement ("CSE")
Program, under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act,5' provides for a
joint federal, state, and local effort to collect support from parents
who are legally obligated to pay. 3 Each state has a CSE agency to
locate noncustodial parents, establish paternity, establish, enforce and
modify support orders, and collect child support payments.5 4 Unfor-
tunately, these agencies are understaffed, underfunded, and largely in-
effective in interstate cases because of conflicting state systems.5 5
Discrepancies in support guidelines between states result in variances
in the amount of support awarded, providing incentives for noncus-
todial parents to move to states where they would have smaller pay-
ment obligations.5 6 Furthermore, according to a 1991 study, many
local CSE agencies do not provide services to families who do not
45. Id. at 71.
46. Id. at 71.
47. Id. at 72.
48. 1 Clark, supra note 19, § 7.6, at 488. For example, one persistent problem has
been delays in processing a URESA case. See Supporting Our Children, supra note
25, at 229. These delays may be due, in part, to a lack of cooperation between the
initiating and responding jurisdictions. See id at 229-230.
49. Calhoun, supra note 26, at 927.
50. Griffin, supra note 43, at 24.
51. Margaret C. Haynes, Obtaining Jurisdiction in Child Support Cases, Fair$hare,
July 1993, at 4, 6
52. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 651-669 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
53. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, The Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992 [hereinafter CSRA Summary].
54. Id.
55. Paula Roberts, The Case For Fundamental Child Support Reform, Fair$hare,
July 1993, at 8, 8.
56. Roberts, supra note 17, at 27 ("With 54 different sets of guidelines in effect,
there is little equity among similarly situated families who live in different states.").
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receive Aid to Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC")
benefits.57
Other problems are more pronounced in interstate cases. For ex-
ample, interstate enforcement efforts have been hindered by conflict-
ing state regulations, confusing federal requirements, and burdensome
caseloads .5  Furthermore, locating the noncustodial parent often
proves to be difficult. Many support orders are never processed be-
cause a state lacks sophisticated computer systems that would provide
employment, tax, and credit reports to aid in locating absent parents.59
While the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 19846 and the
Family Support Act of 198861 have facilitated child support collection
through federal tax refund offsets, state tax refund offsets, unemploy-
ment compensation intercepts, and direct wage withholding, 62 these
means of collection often are hindered by difficulties in locating the
noncustodial parent and by issues regarding which court or agency has
jurisdiction. 3
The more than 2.5 million custodial parents who do not receive full
payment, accounting for more than $5 billion in unpaid support obli-
gations, demonstrates that existing programs are not adequately ad-
dressing the child support enforcement problem.' The problem
stems in part from our federalist system of co-equal state govern-
ments; each state's respect for the other's autonomy exacerbates the
interstate collection process. The ramifications can be tumultuous.
For families, the inability to collect child support may result in a lack
of money to spend for a child's necessities, including food, clothing,
and shelter.6 5 For state and federal governments, expenditures for
public benefits increase, draining financial resources that could be
57. Id. at 26.
58. Calhoun, supra note 26, at 924.
59. Roberts, supra note 17, at 26.
60. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
61. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
62. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 5. From 1989 to 1993, national wage with-
holding collections more than doubled. Wage withholding collections totaled S4.7 bil-
lion in 1993, making it the most powerful collection method for obtaining child
support payments. Congressional Report, supra note 17, at 20. The second most ef-
fective collection method is federal income tax refund offsets, which accounted for
nationwide collections of more than $609 million in 1993. i at 39.
63. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 28.
64. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
65. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 26-27. A 1992 study based on interviewvs with
low and moderate-income women demonstrates the gravity of the problem. Within
the first year after the father left the household, 32% of children were without ade-
quate food, 37% were without proper clothing, 55% lacked medical care, 57% lost
their regular child care, and nearly half lost their housing. Id.
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used elsewhere in the economy.66 From both social and economic
standpoints, nonsupport imposes significant costs on society.
II. CONGRESS'S RESPONSE: A FEDERAL CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT
STATUTE
In response to the states' ineffectiveness in enforcing child support
awards, Representative Henry Hyde introduced a bill designed to
punish deadbeat parents and improve child support collection.67 In
1992, Congress passed, and President George Bush signed into law,68
the CSRA.69 In signing this law that makes failure to pay child sup-
port a federal crime, the President noted the more than $5 billion in
child support that goes unpaid in the United States each year and the
resulting reliance of these families on the welfare system.70
Criminal sanctions for nonsupport have numerous advantages over
the various civil remedies available for enforcing child support orders.
First, the local prosecutor may provide swifter enforcement than the
often backlogged child support agency.7 1 Second, criminal enforce-
ment may reduce recidivism for the particular defendant and deter the
general population from committing the crime.72 Third, in interstate
cases, the threat of extradition may encourage a defendant to comply
with a court order.73 Finally, making nonsupport a crime demon-
strates that the nation recognizes the seriousness of the child support
66. See Andrea H. Beller & John W. Graham, Small Change: The Economics of
Child Support 233 (1993); see also infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the relationship between the failure to pay child support and increased public
assistance). Between 1970 and 1992, the number of AFDC recipients increased by
83%, from 7.4 million to 13.6 milion, and the number of families receiving AFDC
increased by 150%, from 1.9 million to 4.8 million. Congressional Report, supra note
17, at 6.
Too often, however, public benefits do not adequately substitute for uncollected
support payments. Many families with working mothers are not eligible for AFDC.
Roberts, supra note 17, at 6. Moreover, the average monthly AFDC benefit per fam-
ily has been declining. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, the average AFDC benefit per family, after accounting for inflation, was$644 in 1970, but only $388 in 1992. Congressional Report, supra note 17, at 6. Cur-
rent welfare reform may abolish or severely disable AFDC, further aggravating the
problem. See Robert Pear, House Committee Completes Plan to Overhaul Welfare,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1995, at 9.
67. Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support:
Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1992).
68. Statement on Signing the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 28 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2122 (Oct. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Statement By President Bush].
69. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
70. Statement By President Bush, supra note 68, at 2122.
71. Eleanor H. Landstreet, State and Federal Criminal Nonsupport Prosecution,




CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
enforcement problem and is willing to respond to it in a forceful
manner.
A. The Elements of the CSRA
The CSRA marks a major change from other child support legisla-
tion because it makes the failure to pay child support a federal crime.
While almost all states have laws making nonsupport a crime,74 these
statutes are largely ineffective in interstate cases.75 The major limita-
tion of these state laws is the jurisdictional hurdle-one state cannot
prosecute for the violation of another state's order. 76
The CSRA provides that "[w]hoever willfully fails to pay a past due
support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State
shall be punished" with a fine or imprisonment.77 To be punishable
under the Act, the past-due child support obligation must be either
greater than $5000 or must have remained unpaid for more than one
year.78 Interstate flight by a defendant is not an element of the of-
fense;79 a noncustodial parent, therefore, may be eligible for prosecu-
tion even if the custodial parent relocates to a different state.
A first offense under the CSRA is a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of up to $5000 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both.80 For a second or subsequent conviction, a defendant may be
fined up to $250,000 and imprisoned for not more than two years.81
The CSRA is intended to supplement other child support enforce-
ment programs already in existence, particularly the CSE Program.az
Generally, cases that are accepted for federal prosecution are those
that have proven unenforceable using the means available through the
CSE programas3 An individual applying directly to the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office may be referred to her state or local CSE Office to ensure
that alternative remedies have been attempted.' After the CSE Of-
fice screens a case, the matter is referred to the U.S. Attorney's Of-
74. Griffin, supra note 43, at 30. According to the Association for Children for
Enforcement of Support, at least 42 states have made willful failure to pay child sup-
port a crime. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 5-6.
75. Griffin, supra note 43, at 30.
76. Id
77. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a), (b) (1994).
78. Id. § 228(d)(1)(B).
79. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General, Janet Reno, to United
States Attorneys: Prosecutive Guidelines and Procedures for the Child Support Re-
covery Act of 1992, at 1 (July 13, 1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [here-
inafter Prosecutive Guidelines].
80. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 228(b)(1), 3559(a)(7), 3571(b)(6) (1994).
81. See id. §§ 228(b)(2), 3559(a)(5), 3571(b)(4).
82. CSRA Summary, supra note 53; see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.




fice, which will prosecute only if "all reasonably available remedies
have been exhausted. '85
Before the U.S. Attorney will prosecute an alleged deadbeat par-
ent, a letter is sent to the potential defendant advising him of the ap-
parent CSRA violation and requesting payment of the support
obligation within a specified period.86 If payment is not made, the
matter is referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.87 Prior to
filing charges, a second letter is sent to the would-be defendant, advis-
ing him that charges will be filed against him unless he makes pay-
ment within a specified period of time.88 If payment still is not
forthcoming and there is no adequate explanation for nonpayment,
the U.S. Attorney will charge the parent with violating the CSRA.8 9
Once charges are filed, in order to convict a defendant under the
CSRA, the United States must prove five elements. Guidelines re-
quire that: (1) a known past-due support obligation exists; (2) the ob-
ligation is either greater than $5000 or has remained unpaid for longer
than one year; (3) the defendant had the ability to pay the obligation;
(4) the defendant willfully failed to pay the obligation; and (5) the
child resides in another state.90
B. The Limited Use of the CSRA
Recently, the CSRA received significant publicity following the
arrest of a New York man who fled to Vermont to avoid paying over
$580,000 in past-due child support." The arrest received national at-
tention, with the defendant, Jeffrey A. Nichols, earning the infamous
title of "America's Worst Deadbeat Dad."'  Nichols was the first per-
son to be prosecuted in New York City under the Act.93 Slightly more
than fifty cases have been prosecuted nationwide, with fewer than half
resulting in convictions.94
One reason the CSRA is used so sparingly is the requirement that
willfulness be established. The government must prove that the de-
fendant "knew about the obligation, was financially able to meet it at
85. Prosecutive Guidelines, supra note 79, at 4.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1.
91. See James C. McKinley Jr., Investment Adviser Jailed in Child Support Case,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1995, at B1.
92. People, Sept. 4, 1995, at cover. The government hoped that Nichols's prosecu-
tion would deter deadbeat parents. Some children's advocates have argued, however,
that low and middle-income parents may feel that only the most egregious cases will
be prosecuted. See Sheila A. Feeney, Law's Still Easy to (Dead)beat, N.Y. Daily
News, Oct. 3, 1995, at 43.
93. McKinley, supra note 91, at B4.
94. Feeney, supra note 92, at 43. According to a Justice Department spokesman,
however, there are almost 500 matters under investigation. Id.
1098 [Vol. 64
CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
the time it was due, and intentionally did not pay it."'95 For purposes
of the CSRA, "willfulness is the knowing and intentional violation of
a known legal duty."'  "Willfulness cannot be presumed from non-
payment alone,"97 but partial payment may negate willfulness by sug-
gesting that the defendant did not have the financial resources to
fulfill the entire obligation.98 The willfulness standard is difficult to
meet, and for this reason, in part, many CSRA cases involve instances
of tax, bank, or bankruptcy fraud.99
Furthermore, guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice
regarding implementation of the CSRA give some indication why the
statute is used so infrequently. As discussed above, federal prosecu-
tion is favored where all reasonably available civil and state remedies
have been exhausted or where state remedies have proven ineffec-
tive.100 Attorney General Janet Reno wrote that the Justice Depart-
ment guidelines were "intended to ensure effective prosecution of the
CSRA by providing a means for selecting egregious cases which states
are unable to handle because of the interstate nature of the case."' 01
Priority is given if a would-be defendant: (1) moves from state to
state to avoid payment; (2) changes employment, conceals his assets
or location, or uses false social security numbers; (3) fails to make
support payments after being held in contempt of court; or (4) com-
mits some other federal offense such as tax, bank, or bankruptcy
fraud.102
Finally, another reason why the CSRA is seldom utilized is that
Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds to cover the cost of
prosecuting the millions of deadbeat parents. 0 3 Some U.S. Attorneys
also have cited lack of time to train and prepare their staffs for in-
creased caseloads as a contributing factor.01
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The putative constitutional basis for the CSRA is Article I, Section
8 of the United States Constitution, commonly referred to as the
Commerce Clause.'0 5 It provides in part that Congress shall have the
power to "regulate Commere ... among the several States."'0 6 The
95. CSRA Summary, supra note 53.
96. Prosecutive Guidelines, supra note 79, at 2 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192, 201 (1991)).
97. Id (citation omitted).
98. Id.
99. See infra text accompanying note 102.
100. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
101. Prosecutive Guidelines, supra note 79, at 1.
102. Id. at 4-5; CSRA Summary, supra note 53.
103. Feeney, supra note 92, at 43.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
106. U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Supreme Court first defined the nature of Congress's commerce
power in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden."°7 There, the Court held: "Com-
merce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-it is inter-
course. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse. "108
For years following the New Deal, the Court took an expansive
view of "commerce" and upheld a broad spectrum of legislation deal-
ing with national economic and social issues, including laws in areas
such as criminal law and civil rights.10 9 The motive for such legislation
need not have been a commercial one, but rather one of morality or
social utility." 0 United States v. Lopez,"' which held unconstitutional
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,112 appears to have been an
exception to the Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. The decision marked the first time since 1936 that the Court
invalidated an act of Congress as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause." '3 Lopez also represented a new reluctance on the part of the
Court to defer to Congress's definition of what "interstate commerce"
means.1 4 A brief discussion of the expansion of Congress's com-
merce power and the radical shift embodied in Lopez follows.
A. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Before Lopez
Decisions prior to Lopez demonstrate the expansive nature of Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce and the deference the Court gave
to Congress to enact legislation pursuant to this power. The Court
considered Congress the more capable branch of government for de-
fining national commercial problems and developing solutions to
those problems." 5
For example, in 1937 the Court found that the power to regulate
commerce could include more traditionally intrastate activities. In
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,116
107. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
108. Id. at 188.
109. 1 Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 7, § 4.8, at 400; see infra notes 130-48 and
accompanying text.
110. See 1 Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 7, §§ 4.8, 4.10, at 400, 411-16.
111. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
112. Id. at 1626.
113. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
114. See Editorial, The High Court Loses Restraint, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1995, at 22
[hereinafter Court Loses Restraint]. Prior to Lopez, the Court upheld acts of Con-
gress provided there was a rational argument upon which Congress could find a rela-
tion between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 1 Rotunda & Nowak,
supra note 7, § 4.8, at 395.
115. See 1 Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 7, § 4.1, at 356.
116. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935117 against
an employer's unfair labor practices.118 The Court held that Congress
may regulate intrastate activities that have "a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce."' 19
Four years later, Commerce Clause jurisprudence took another sig-
nificant stride when, in United States v. Darby,20 the Court upheld the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,12 which set minimum wage and
maximum hour standards for employees engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce.' The Court disregarded Congress's
motive for enacting the statute, referring to motive as a matter of leg-
islative judgment upon which the courts have no control.' 3 The
Court held that Congress's commerce power extends to intrastate ac-
tivities which "affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it."'24
The Court's most expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, however, probably came in 1942, in Wickard v. Filburn.12 5
Wickard involved Congress's right to establish quotas on the raising of
wheat pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.126 The
owner of a small farm challenged the government's right to limit the
amount of wheat grown on his farm and consumed on the premises.12 7
The Court found that wheat grown for home consumption would sub-
stantially affect price and market conditions by supplying the needs of
the farmer which otherwise would be supplied by outside
purchases.128 The Court established the "aggregative effect" princi-
ple: while one farmer's effect on the wheat market may not be sub-
stantial, "taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
[it] is far from trivial."' 29
Furthermore, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States'31 demon-
strates Congress's ability to enact statutes whose primary purpose is
not commercial. The Court upheld an application of Title II of the
117. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
118. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 49.
119. Id. at 37.
120. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
121. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
122. Darby, 312 U.S. at 109-10, 125.
123. Id at 115.
124. Id at 118.
125. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
126. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 7 U.S.C.); see Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.
127. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-14.
128. Id at 127-28.
129. Id at 128.
130. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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Civil Rights Act of 196411' to a motel which refused to rent rooms to
African Americans. 132 The motel was located near interstate high-
ways, advertised nationally, and derived seventy-five percent of its
business from out-of-state guests. 33 The Court reasoned that racial
discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce by impeding
the interstate travel of African Americans. 3 4 Although the operation
of a motel may be considered a local activity, "The power of Congress
to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate
the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States
of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful
effect upon that commerce."'1 35 Moreover, the fact that Title II princi-
pally regulated a moral and social wrong did not restrict Congress
from enacting the statute. 36 The Court deferred to Congress's judg-
ment to enact legislation; because Congress had a rational basis for
finding that racial discrimination affected commerce and the means
selected to eliminate discrimination were reasonable and appropriate,
the statute was upheld.137
Similarly, Katzenbach v. McClung'38 upheld an application of Title
II to Ollie's Barbecue, a family-owned restaurant.' 39 The restaurant
was located relatively far from an interstate highway and received no
appreciable business from out-of-state customers, yet purchased forty-
six percent of its meat from a supplier that bought from out-of-state
sources. i 0 The Court again deferred to Congress, stating that all that
was needed to uphold the statute was a rational basis to find that ra-
cial discrimination adversely affected the flow of interstate com-
merce.' 4' Returning to the reasoning employed in Wickard, the Court
held that although the value of food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue
that had traveled in interstate commerce was by itself insignificant, the
restaurant's discriminatory conduct was representative of similar con-
duct throughout the country. 14 2 This conduct, in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce. 43
131. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000b (1988) (providing for injunctive relief against discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public
accommodation)).
132. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243, 261.
133. Id. at 243.
134. Id. at 253.
135. Id. at 258.
136. Id. at 257.
137. Id. at 258-59.
138. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
139. Id. at 296.
140. Id. at 296-98.
141. Id. at 303-04.
142. Id. at 301; see supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
143. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301.
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Finally, Perez v. United States"' exemplified the Court's willingness
to defer to Congressional findings. The Court upheld Title II of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act,' 4 which made extortionate credit
transactions a federal crime.'" The Court found that the transactions,
otherwise known as loan sharking, accounted for a substantial propor-
tion of the income accumulated by organized crime syndicates, many
of which were interstate in character. 4 7 Congressional findings stated
that although the transactions were purely intrastate, they neverthe-
less directly affected interstate commerce. 1'4
Thus, the Court has held that Congress is empowered to legislate in
areas such as labor relations, civil rights, and criminal law. As long as
Congress found some rational relationship and an aggregate substan-
tial effect between the activity being regulated and interstate com-
merce, it could legislate pursuant to its commerce power.
B. United States v. Lopez149
Although the above-mentioned cases represented a continuous ex-
pansion of Congress's commerce power, the Supreme Court appears
to have taken a more restrictive view of that power in Lopez. While
Lopez did not overrule earlier Commerce Clause cases, the decision
represented a substantial departure from earlier interpretations of the
Commerce Clause' 50
The defendant in Lopez had been convicted of violating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"),' 5' which made the pos-
session of a gun "at a place that [an] individual knows, or has reason-
able cause to believe, is a school zone" a federal crime.'5 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the CSRA
was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
power.1
53
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the
GFSZA was within Congress's commerce power because the statute
regulated an activity which "substantially affect[ed] interstate com-
merce."1-4 The government suggested a "costs of crime" nexus-that
the possession of guns in a school zone would result in an increase in
144. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
145. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159-64 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1994)).
146. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-47.
147. See id. at 155-57.
148. Id. at 156. The Court indicated, however, that Congress would not have been
required to make particularized findings in order to enact the statute. Id.
149. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
150. See Court Loses Restraint, supra note 114, at 22.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994); see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
153. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
154. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632
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violent crime, which in turn would decrease travel to unsafe areas and
increase societal costs through higher insurance rates. 15  Further-
more, under a "national productivity" reasoning, the government as-
serted that firearm possession would threaten the learning
environment, which in turn would create a less productive citizenry
and adversely affect the nation's economic well-being. 156
The Court rejected these arguments, and in a 5-4 decision, affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's ruling that the GFSZA was an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of Congress's commerce power.' 57 The Court held that because
the defendant was a local student at a local school, and because the
statute did not require that the possession of the firearm have any
nexus to interstate commerce, Congress was not authorized to enact
the GFSZA.158 In order to uphold the statute, the Court "would have
to pile inference upon inference... to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort re-
tained by the States.' 1 59 The possession of a handgun on school
grounds was not "an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."1 60
To reach its conclusion, the Court identified three broad categories
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power:
First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate com-
merce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect in-
terstate commerce. 6
The Court quickly dismissed the first two categories: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the GFSZA "is not a
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it
an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through the channels of commerce; nor [is it] a regulation.., to pro-
tect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate
commerce."'
162
The Court, therefore, concluded that if the GFSZA was to be up-
held, it would have to be sustained as a regulation of an activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce. 63 Relying on the third
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1626.
158. Id. at 1634.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 1630.
163. Id.
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category, however, the Court did not find a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce and, accordingly, struck down the statute.
First, the Court held that the GFSZA "is a criminal statute that by
its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."'' 6 If the
Court were to accept the government's "costs of crime" argument,
Congress would be able to regulate "not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously
they relate to interstate commerce."'' Similarly, acceptance of the
government's "national productivity" reasoning would permit Con-
gress to regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens, including marriage, divorce, and
child custody, which typically are within the province of the states.16
The Court voiced concern that without some limit on congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, there would be few restrictions
on federal power. 67
The Court also found that the GFSZA was not an "essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated." 68 Because the statute did not regulate commercial activity, it
could not be sustained under the rationale ingrained in cases like
Wickard which upheld regulations of activities that arose out of or
were connected with a commercial transaction that when "viewed in
the aggregate, substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce." 16 9
Second, the Court held that the GFSZA "contain[ed] no jurisdic-
tional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce."170
Absent some jurisdictional element, the relationship between inter-
state commerce and any firearm in the possession of a high school
student was too attenuated to justify Congress's intrusion into a crimi-
nal matter of primarily local concern.1 71
Finally, the Court reasoned that the government had conceded that
neither the statute nor its legislative history contained any findings
concerning the effects upon interstate commerce of a gun in a school
zone.'-, While the omission of formal findings as to the substantial
burden an activity has on interstate commerce was not dispositive, the
presence of such findings would have enabled the Court to evaluate
164. Id- at 1630-31 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1632 (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 1d at 1631.
169. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
170. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
171. United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (1995) (discussing Lopez).
172. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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Congress's judgment that the activity in question affected interstate
commerce.
173
IV. POST-LOPEZ CHALLENGES To Ti CSRA
Lopez marked a change from previous Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. As a result of the decision, the validity of previously settled
law has been called into question. 174 Among the statutes potentially
affected by the Lopez about-face is the CSRA.
Because Congress enacted the CSRA pursuant to its commerce
power, the validity of the Act depends upon the presence of some
significant relationship between child support and interstate com-
merce. In light of Lopez, a number of district courts have heard chal-
lenges to the CSRA. 175
A. Courts Holding the CSRA Unconstitutional
The immediate impact of Lopez has been to divide the courts on
the constitutionality of the CSRA. Thus far, three district courts, rely-
ing on the change in Commerce Clause analysis introduced by Lopez,
have held the CSRA unconstitutional.
The first decision to declare the CSRA unconstitutional was United
States v. Schroeder. 76 The facts of Schroeder are as follows: In April
1992, the Arizona Superior Court ordered the defendant to pay $759
per month in support to his ex-wife and children. 77 Almost three
years later, the defendant, who had moved to Illinois, owed more than
$24,000 in past-due support.' 78 The defendant was indicted under the
CSRA, but Judge Rosenblatt of the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona dismissed the indictment in light of Lopez. 79
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court in Schroe-
der relied upon the three categories enumerated in Lopez to deter-
mine whether a federal statute is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause: "Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate com-
merce . . . protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce...
[and] regulate those activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce.' 180 The court found that in order to uphold the
CSRA, the collection of past-due child support payments, like the
173. Id. at 1631-32.
174. See Court Loses Restraint, supra note 114, at 22.
175. The challenges to the CSRA are multiplying rapidly. In addition to the cases
analyzed below, other courts are likely to reach decisions regarding the constitutional-
ity of the Act in the near future.
176. 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995). The court issued a virtually identical com-
panion opinion on the same day. See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D.
Ariz. 1995).
177. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 361-62.
178. Id. at 362.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995)).
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possession of a firearm in Lopez, would have to fit into the third cate-
gory, i.e., it must have a "substantial relation to interstate
commerce."
181
Judge Rosenblatt did not find a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, and held the CSRA unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause."ar In reaching this conclusion, the court examined four princi-
ple areas: (1) the criminal nature of the CSRA; (2) the adequacy of
the nexus between interstate commerce and the parent and child liv-
ing in different states; (3) the effect of nonsupport on federal monies;
and (4) the legislative history of the statute.1'
First, the court held that the CSRA, like the GFSZA, "is a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms."'1 4 The court emphasized that numerous states have criminal
nonsupport statutes.'85 "To allow Congress to pass a national criminal
statute addressing this area would allow Congress to usurp the author-
ity of those States which have chosen specifically not to criminalize
the failure to pay child support payments .... ."I These states have
contemplated the pros and cons of enacting a criminal nonsupport
181. Id. at 364.
182. Id. at 368-69. Aside from holding that the CSRA was invalid under the Com-
merce Clause, the court in Schroeder also held that the CSRA violated the Tenth
Amendment and was unconstitutional based on principles of federalism and comity.
Id. at 367-68. This Note examines the constitutionality of the CSRA exclusively
under the Commerce Clause; a thorough discussion of federalism and comity is be-
yond its scope. The issues of federalism and comity, however, were addressed in
United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995), where the court upheld
the CSRA. The court stated that:
While principles of federalism and comity do suggest that federal courts
should generally not interfere with state criminal prosecutions, and other
state law functions, this Court can find no case where those "principles"
were held to be grounds to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. The
principles of federalism and comity are made evident in a concrete manner
when a federal court "abstains" from taking certain actions or deciding cer-
tain cases.
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393; see also infra text accompanying notes 222-28 (analyzing
Hopper under the Commerce Clause). Moreover, although federal courts are reluc-
tant to exercise diversity jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, any domestic rela-
tions exception is applicable only where there exists no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction beyond diversity of citizenship. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp.
1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 203-10 (analyzing
Hampshire under the Commerce Clause). If Congress were permitted to enact the
CSRA pursuant to its commerce power, the Act would by definition be a federal
question. See United States v. Sage, No. 3:95CR108 (DJS), 1995 WL 627950, at *5 (D.
Conn. Oct. 3, 1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 229-35 (analyzing Sage
under the Commerce Clause).
183. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 364-67.
184. Id. at 364 (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31).




statute and, for whatever reason, have specifically chosen not to do
SO.187
Second, the court found that the CSRA's jurisdictional element,
which requires that the noncustodial parent and the child reside in
different states, did not establish a substantial relation to interstate
commerce.188 The court held that the Act "is clearly not tailored to
address only those parents who specifically flee from a state in order
to avoid paying child support."'18 9 The prosecutor need not prove in-
tent to flee on the part of the parent obligated to pay support, and
CSRA prosecution is possible when the custodial parent moves out of
state while the noncustodial remains in his place of residence. 190
Thus, "[t]he nexus of requiring the non-paying parent and the child to
live in different states goes beyond those cases the CSRA was aimed
to address, namely parents who flee a state in an attempt to avoid
child support payment."''
Third, the court rejected the argument that failure to pay child sup-
port payments affects federal monies."9 The court noted the various
civil remedies available for enforcing child support orders and rea-
soned that "[b]ecause the civil legislation is redressing the concerns
claimed to be the basis for the necessity of the CSRA, [the govern-
ment] has failed to show that the CSRA, a criminal statute, is substan-
tially related to interstate commerce."'193
Finally, the court found that no specific legislative history supported
the argument that the CSRA was aimed at interstate commerce.194
While the "legislative history evidences a consideration by Congress
of the need for an interstate nexus when enacting this legislation ...
more is needed. There must be a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."'
195
Less than three months after Schroeder, Judge Biery of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas filed an opinion
invalidating the CSRA in United States v. Bailey.196 The court pro-
fessed that "a statute which sounds, walks, and looks like a duck must
be a duck statute. The CSRA sounds, walks, and looks like a domes-
tic relations statute and aims the central government down a slippery
slope where it should not be."'1 9 7 While not explicitly holding that the
CSRA was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, the court con-
187. Id.
188. Id. at 364-65.
189. Id. at 365.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 365-67.
193. Id. at 366.
194. Id. at 367.
195. Id.
196. No. SA-95-CR-138, 1995 WL 630907 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1995).
197. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
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cluded that because Lopez rejected the "national productivity" argu-
ment asserted by the government, a reasonable inference could be
made that the Supreme Court would find a federal criminal nonsup-
port statute invalid.198
Finally, in United States v. Parker,199 Judge Bechtle of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected
the argument that nonsupport affects interstate commerce increasing
single parents' dependence on welfare and making it more difficult for
these parents to afford necessities such as housing, food, and medical
care.200 Accordingly, the court declared that the Act was not a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.20 1 "Congress had no
rational basis to conclude that the willful failure to pay a child support
obligation substantially affects interstate commerce principally be-
cause that activity... 'has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise .... , 20
B. Courts Holding the CSRA Constitutional
While district courts in Arizona, Texas, and Pennsylvania have held
that Lopez mandated a finding that the CSRA is unconstitutional,
four other district courts have applied Lopez as precedent to reach the
opposite conclusion. These courts thoroughly rejected the rationale of
Schroeder, Bailey, and Parker and found that the Act constitutes a
legitimate exercise of Congress's commerce power.
In United States v. Hampshire,2 3 Judge Kelly of the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas rejected a defendant's chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the CSRA.2°4 The court held that the
CSRA is distinguishable from the GFSZA because the interstate
nexus-the diversity between delinquent parent and child-clearly is
identified in the statute.05 Consequently, "The law has no application
to domestic relations matters occurring entirely within a given
state."2 06
Furthermore, the court implied that based upon the aggregate effect
of the lack of payment, child support substantially affects interstate
commerce.20 7 In enacting the CSRA, the House of Representatives
198. Id. at *1; see supra text accompanying notes 156, 166. The court in Bailey
explicitly declared the CSRA unconstitutional based on principles of federalism and
comity. Bailey, 1995 WL 630907, at *3; see supra note 182 (discussing the inadequacy
of federalism and comity as independent bases for invalidating the CSRA).
199. Crim. No. 95-352, 1995 WL 683215 (ED. Pa. Oct. 30, 1995).
200. Id- at *6-8.
201. Id. at *13.
202. Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995)).
203. 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995).
204. Id. at 1333.
205. Id. at 1329.
206. IM.




considered that "[t]he avoidance of child support obligations exacer-
bates the problem of child poverty" and requires additional govern-
ment expenditures to remedy the problem.2"
Thus, the court concluded that Lopez cannot be read to preclude all
federal legislation touching upon domestic relations.20 9 "Where ...
Congress has determined in a nonarbitrary manner that the willful ac-
tions of private individuals have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce, it may constitutionally proscribe such actions by legislation
which includes an interstate nexus as an explicit element of the
offense. 2
10
A decision similar to Hampshire was reached in United States v.
Murphy,21' where Judge Conrad of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia held that "Lopez does not prohibit
Congress from enacting laws aimed at regulating the use of interstate
travel as a means by which to avoid the legal obligations arising from
family responsibilities. '212 The defendant in Murphy, one of Vir-
ginia's "Ten Most Wanted" child support evaders, fled from state to
state to avoid paying almost five years' worth of child support to his
ex-wife and daughter. 1 3 The court upheld the defendant's CSRA
conviction.214
The court in Murphy emphasized the diversity component of the
CSRA by stressing that in order to be convicted under the CSRA, the
defendant must: (1) reside in a different state from that in which his
dependent child resides; and (2) be required to transfer funds from
one state to another.21 5 The court held that the CSRA, unlike the
GFSZA, has a jurisdictional element that ensures that a monetary
transaction will take place across state lines and that the interests of
residents in different states will come into play before the federal stat-
ute is invoked.216 Furthermore, because a CSRA defendant fre-
quently will have taken advantage of employment opportunities in the
state in which he lives, the requirement that the defendant provide
money to a child in another state has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
217
The court also drew parallels between the CSRA and other federal
statutes that provide a penalty for fleeing across state lines.218 Various
208. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
209. Id at 1330.
210. Id.
211. 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995).
212. Id. at 617.
213. Leslie Taylor, Support Evaders Pursued, Roanoke Tunes & World News, June
10, 1995, at C1.
214. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 617.
215. Id. at 616.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The court analogized the CSRA to 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994), which pro-
vides that an individual may be prosecuted for fleeing a state to avoid prosecution or
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courts have upheld such statutes pursuant to Congress's commerce
power to criminalize activity involving interstate travel2 19 The
CSRA, like these other criminal laws, "seem[s] to be aimed at
preventing an individual from escaping either law enforcement of-
ficers or his own legal obligations by taking advantage of our federal
system of government through flight to another state."'  Moreover,
although the custodial parent in a CSRA case may relocate while the
noncustodial parent remains in-state, this did not occur in the defend-
ant's situation. The defendant fled to another state, became employed
there, and failed to make any payment of child support. 2
Yet another court, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, upheld the CSRA under the Commerce Clause.
In United States v. Hopper,' Judge Hussman emphasized that the
jurisdictional element of the Act, which requires diversity between the
noncustodial parent and the child, ensures that federal law enforce-
ment authority cannot be invoked in intrastate cases.m3 Moreover,
the jurisdictional element recognizes the sovereignty of each state in
domestic relations and the limited power of states to reach beyond
their borders to enforce child support obligations.224
The court also found that "the act of collecting an obligation,
though dealing with an intangible, does amount to commerce."2' 5
Child support collection involves "a continuous and indivisible stream
of intercourse among the states." 226 While the support order itself
may be generated intrastate, a chain of events is set in motion "involv-
ing the transmission of large sums of money and communications by
mail, telephone, and telegraph."' ' 7 This chain of events provides a
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to uphold the statute.228
Finally, the court in United States v. Sage2 9 held that the CSRA is
constitutional because nonsupport substantially affects interstate com-
merce.23 In upholding the Act, Judge Squatrito of the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut considered the "abun-
dance of legislative history regarding the economic effects of the non-
a legal compulsion to testify. Furthermore, the court cited 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994),
which provides that whoever willfully transports an abductee across state lines may be
held criminally liable in federal court. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
219. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
223. Id. at 392.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 393.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. No. 3:95CR108 (DJS), 1995 WL 627950 (D. Conn. Oct. 3, 1995).
230. Id. at *2.
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payment of interstate [child] support."23' Moreover, the court noted
that the jurisdictional element of the CSRA assured that in each appli-
cation of the Act a nexus to interstate commerce would exist.232
The court also held that although "[s]upport payments might not be
considered traditional items of 'commerce,' ... the non-payment of
interstate support obligations is economic activity in a way that mere
possession of a handgun in [a] school zone is not. '233 Nonpayment of
support causes noncustodial parents to reap economic benefits, while
children suffer corresponding economic losses.23 In the aggregate,
nonpayment causes vast changes in the consumption of interstate
goods by parents and their children as well as a substantial shift in the
interstate flow of goods.235
Thus, Lopez has divided the lower courts as to the constitutionality
of the CSRA. This uncertainty must be resolved because interstate
enforcement of child support orders is an endemic problem. If the
CSRA is to solve, rather than exacerbate, this problem, its constitu-
tionality must be firmly established. Otherwise, enforcement efforts
will be delayed by litigation of the constitutional question as well as by
the usual difficulties of interstate enforcement.
V. TH CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CSRA
The division among the district courts over the CSRA demonstrates
the possibility that Lopez will have far-reaching consequences. For all
its apparent radicalism, however, Lopez did not purport to overrule
any of the Court's previous Commerce Clause decisions. The deci-
sions enumerated in part III.A. of this Note remain "good law" and
are applicable to an assessment of the constitutionality of the Act.
This Note argues that the CSRA is more akin to the statutes upheld
in these cases than to the statute struck down in Lopez. Child support
collection, unlike the possession of a gun, is an economic activity with
both immediate and secondary effects on commerce.236 While con-
gressional findings accompanying the GFSZA may generously be de-
scribed as sparse, the legislative history of the CSRA indicates that
Congress's primary concern was the interstate aspect of the child sup-
port enforcement problem and its economic repercussions.237 More-
over, the jurisdictional element of the CSRA, which requires diversity
between the noncustodial parent and child, provides an interstate
231. Id. at *4.
232. Id. at *5.
233. ld. at *3 (citations omitted).
234. Id.
235. 1L at *4.
236. See infra notes 239-59 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
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nexus that was lacking in the GFSZA.3m This section will examine
these distinctions.
A. The Economics of Child Support
Nonsupport influences the flow of money in interstate commerce
and affects the poverty level and public assistance expenditures. Most
importantly, from a constitutional standpoint, the child support pay-
ment obligation, unlike the possession of a firearm in a school zone,
involves an economic activity.
Because the GFSZA's noncommercial nature precipitated its down-
fall, the economic aspect of child support may be the decisive factor in
evaluating the validity of the CSRA. The Court in Lopez did not
eradicate sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but merely
concluded that the expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause
that the Court had developed since the New Deal did not permit up-
holding the GFSZA:
Even Wickard... involved economic activity in a way that the pos-
session of a gun in a school zone does not....
[The GFSZA] is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. [The GFSZA] is not an es-
sential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce? 3 9
Thus, the Court did not reject the "substantial effects" test. Rather
the Court supplemented the test with a requirement that the regulated
activity have a commercial or economic nature. With regard to this
commercial/noncommercial distinction, Lopez may signal a change in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Pre-Lopez decisions focused not
upon the commercial nature of the regulated activity, but upon
whether that activity substantially affected interstate commerce.240
238. See infra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
239. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer indicated that
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146(1971), focused on the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce rather
than on the economic/noneconomic nature of that activity:.
[If a distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities is to be
made, [Lopez] is not the case in which to make it. The majority clearly can-
not intend such a distinction to focus narrowly on an act of gun possession
standing by itself, for such a reading could not be reconciled with either the
civil rights cases ... or Perez-in each of those cases the specific transaction
... was not itself "commercial."
Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
Moreover, Justice Breyer emphasized that the Court in Wickard expressly held that
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Despite the "commercial" requirement under Lopez, the CSRA is
constitutional. The CSRA may be distinguished from the GFSZA be-
cause the child support transaction involves money changing hands, a
traditional economic activity, whereas the possession of a gun in a
school zone does not.241 Indeed, the basic function of child support is
an economic one-to provide money to the custodial parent on behalf
of the child. Each support order involves a transaction-an immedi-
ate obligation to pay a sum of money to another party. Once payment
is made, dollars are exchanged across state lines in satisfaction of the
obligation. Moreover, as suggested in Hopper, even should the order
remain unpaid, an economic obligation nonetheless exists.2 42
Accordingly, the child support payment obligation more closely ap-
proximates the economic activities regulated and upheld in Wickard243
(producing and consuming wheat), Heart of Atlanta MotelP" (operat-
ing a motel), Katzenbach245 (operating a restaurant), and Perez24 6 (en-
gaging in extortionate credit transactions) than the conduct at issue in
Lopez247 (possessing a firearm). Consequently, pre-Lopez jurispru-
dence is more applicable to an assessment of the constitutionality of
the CSRA than is Lopez, and the CSRA should be upheld pursuant to
the Court's expansive Commerce Clause holdings prior to Lopez. If
one farmer's primarily intrastate activity in Wickard can be deemed to
affect interstate commerce substantially, so must the forlorn obliga-
tion of a deadbeat parent which, in the aggregate, accounts for more
than $5 billion in unpaid child support.2 48
Thus, the child support payment obligation itself, as an economic
activity, has a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Yet, even
in an ancillary fashion, nonsupport in many ways relates to and influ-
ences commerce-it results in increases in federal, state, and local ex-
penditures, leads to a greater incidence of poverty, and alters the flow
of money in interstate commerce.
First, the nonpayment of child support leads to increases in expend-
itures for public assistance programs, thus affecting government fiscal
policy and adversely influencing the ability of the federal government,
states, and localities to manage their limited resources. Almost one-
half of the families headed by single mothers receive welfare, and
an activity may be regulated, "'though it may not be regarded as commerce,' . . . so
long as 'it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.'" Id. at, 1663-
64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (em-
phasis added)); see supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
241. United States v. Sage, No. 3:95CR108 (DJS), 1995 WL 627950, at *3 (D. Conn.
Oct. 3, 1995).
242. See United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 130-37.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
246. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
247. See supra part III.B.
248. See supra notes 24, 125-29 and accompanying text.
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"there is little doubt that the proportion needing welfare at any time
would increase quite dramatically in the absence of any public en-
forcement of private child support."2' 9 Both the federal government
and the states share these additional costs. The federal government,
for example, contributed $13 billion (fifty-seven percent) of the
money spent on AFDC in 1995..5
Second, single parents who do not receive support are more likely
to live below the poverty line and, in turn, have less money to pour
into the economy by means of expenditures for goods and services. 51
According to Census figures, single mothers had a poverty rate of
thirty-five percent and single fathers had a poverty rate of thirteen
percent-both well above the eight percent rate for married couples
with children. 52 In 1991, custodial parents who actually collected
child support had an average total income twenty-one percent higher
than custodial parents who were awarded child support but did not
receive payment.?5 3 A 1992 study based on interviews with low and
moderate-income women found that within the first year after the fa-
ther leaves, thirty-two percent of children go without food, fifty-five
percent without medical care, and thirty-seven percent without appro-
priate clothing.2-
Research also has shown that a decline in income for a single-parent
family can have serious long-term effects. According to one study,
differences in income between single-parent families and two-parent
families account for a substantial portion of a child's risk of dropping
out of high school or becoming a teen mother.5 5 Thus, the failure to
249. Irwin Garfinkel, Assuring Child Support: An Extension of Social Security 9
(1992) (citation omitted); see supra note 66 and accompanying text. Moreover,
"[w]hen child support payments rise and AFDC participation rates fall, government
expenditures on AFDC are likely to decline. Expenditures decline both because the
number of AFDC recipients falls and because average benefits paid to those who
remain on AFDC are reduced." Belier & Graham, supra note 66, at 233.
250. See Robert Pear, Senate Committee Approves A Vast Overhaul of Welfare,
N.Y. Tmes, May 27, 1995, at 1, 8.
251. See Belier & Graham, supra note 66, at 245. Single mothers who receive child
support have higher incomes and are less likely to live in poverty than mothers who
do not receive their support awards. Id. at 245. Moreover, if average child support
payments were increased, single mothers' current income and short-term economic
well-being would improve. Id at 225; see Roberts, supra note 17, at 2 ("With an aver-
age child support payment of $3,000 per year, a mother of two, working full time at a
low-wage job would still be able to get her family out of poverty if she could obtain
such a payment. Securing regular, reliable child support is thus an integral part of an
anti-poverty strategy.").
252. Child Support 1991, supra note 19, at 1.
253. Id. at 9. The average child support amount received by custodial mothers re-
ceiving all or some payment was $3011; for fathers the amount was $2292. Id. at 2.
254. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
255. McLanahan & Sandefur, supra note 18, at 89-90. Before adjusting for income,
the difference in graduation rates between children in single-parent families and chil-
dren in two-parent families was 6%; after adjusting for income, the difference was
3%. Id Similarly, about 40% of the difference in grade-point average and school
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pay child support affects the custodial parent and child, and can have
profound social and economic implications for future generations.
Third, as Sage demonstrated, even should increases in expenditures
by the noncustodial parent compensate for decreases by the custodial
parent, the flow of money in interstate commerce nonetheless would
be altered .56 Expenditures that would have been made by the custo-
dial parent likely will be made by the noncustodial parent in the state
where he resides, which, necessarily, will differ from the child's home
state.
The argument that these ancillary effects of nonsupport-an in-
crease in public expenditures, a rise in poverty, and a change in the
money flow-substantially affect interstate commerce admittedly may
be difficult to reconcile with Lopez. Indeed, in Lopez the government
unsuccessfully asserted that the possession of guns in a school zone
would increase violent crime, which in turn would decrease travel to
unsafe areas and increase societal costs through increased insurance
rates? 5 7 Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to accept the argu-
ment that the presence of guns in schools would threaten the learning
environment, which in turn would create a less productive citizenry
and adversely affect the nation's economic well-being.258
The nexus between the activity being regulated and interstate com-
merce, however, is more ambiguous with regard to the GFSZA than
to the CSRA. The effects and economic implications of unpaid child
support are more obvious than are the "costs of crime," and do not
require the sweeping inferences that would be needed to uphold the
GFSZA. When custodial parents who do not receive support require
public assistance to recapture some of their lost income, the federal
government, the states, and the taxpayers bear the brunt of these ad-
ditional costs. When public benefits do not fully substitute for the loss
of support payments, the custodial parent has less money to spend on
goods and services for her child. Even when the amount of money
moving in commerce does not change, the flow of money in interstate
commerce is affected.
Thus, the child support payment obligation itself is an economic ac-
tivity which substantially influences interstate commerce. With more
than 2.5 million parents who do not receive their full support pay-
ments, 259 the increases in expenditures and poverty and the resulting
changes in the interstate flow of money provide bases for upholding
the Act.
performance can be attributed to single parents' lower incomes. Id. at 91. Lower
income is also a substantial cause of higher teen birth rates among children of single
parents. The difference in the risks of teen births is 9% before adjusting for income
and 4% after adjusting for income. Id. at 90.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
257. See supra notes 155, 165 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 156, 166 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 23.
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B. Congressional Findings
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Lopez, stated that the test for uphold-
ing the GFSZA should have been "whether Congress could have had
a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection be-
tween gun-related school violence and interstate commerce." 26 Jus-
tice Breyer found such a rational basis, despite the lack of express
legislative findings of an interstate commerce nexus.
The Court's decision, however, was somewhat driven by the dearth
of findings. The majority held that while "Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce," such findings would have been
helpful in considering Congress's judgment that the activity in ques-
tion substantially affected interstate commerce.26'
Unlike the GFSZA, the legislative history of the CSRA provides
evidence that Congress considered, in particular, the interstate aspect
of the problem the statute was seeking to remedy. The findings
clearly indicate that Congress aimed to ensure that only interstate
cases would come within the province of the CSRA:
[The CSRA] addresses the problem of interstate enforcement of
child support by taking the incentive out of moving interstate to
avoid payment. The bill is designed to target interstate cases only.
These are the cases which state officials report to be clearly the
most difficult to enforce, especially the "hard core" group of parents
who flagrantly refuse to pay and whom traditional extradition pro-
cedures have utterly failed to bring to justice. 2
This statement seems a clear indication of Congress's intent to spe-
cially target cases with a substantial interstate nexus.
Furthermore, the legislative history contains findings concerning
the interstate aspect of the CSRA and the effect of child support on
federal expenditures and family economics. Congress examined the
annual $5 billion discrepancy between the amount of child support
awarded and the amount collected, and noted that this deficit "greatly
increases the cost to the States and the Federal government in helping
[] families 'make ends meet,' "73 particularly through increased en-
rollment in the AFDC program.264 A thirty-nine percent increase in
the number of single-mother households over the past decade, and the
resultant increase in the number of these families living below the
poverty level, provided additional impetus for the passage of the
260. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 1631-32.
262. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 6.
263. Id. at 5.
264. Id at 5 (stating that in 1988, 6A million children from homes in which the
father was absent were enrolled in the AFDC program, and that this number has
since increased); see supra notes 66, 249-50 and accompanying text.
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Act.265 Congress reasoned that these figures "make clear that finan-
cial support from non-custodial parents is essential in helping children
and their caretaker remain or become self-sufficient. 266
Moreover, the Court has upheld a federal criminal statute after de-
ferring to congressional findings regarding an activity's effect upon in-
terstate commerce. In Perez, the Court upheld Title II of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which criminally sanctioned loan
sharking.267 The Court deferred to congressional findings which con-
cluded that loan sharking, although purely intrastate in nature, never-
theless directly affected interstate commerce.268 Analogously, the
legislative history accompanying the CSRA lends support to the con-
clusion that child support substantially affects interstate commerce. 269
Finally, while the courts that overturned the CSRA did so for fear
that the Act permitted Congress to usurp the traditional rights of the
states to define and enforce criminal law, the legislative history of the
CSRA does not evidence an intent on the part of Congress to preempt
state law. Congress considered the successes of the Child Support En-
forcement Amendments of 1984 and the Family Support Act of 1988,
but recognized that in interstate cases "the annual deficit in child sup-
port payments remains unacceptably high."27 Congress also noted
that many states have statutes making the willful failure to pay child
271support a crime. Congress realized, however, that "the ability of
[these] states to enforce such laws outside their own boundaries is se-
verely limited. 272
Thus, the CSRA was a rational response by Congress to account for
difficulties specific to interstate child support enforcement. At best,
existing state and federal laws provided an unwieldy approach to the
enforcement problem. Congress did not intend for the CSRA to sub-
stitute for existing statutes and programs, but rather hoped that the
Act would complement state and federal legislation only where most
needed-in interstate cases.
C. The Jurisdictional Element
The CSRA clearly identifies an interstate nexus by providing that
"[w]hoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with
265. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 4-5.
266. Id. at 5.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
268. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
269. Furthermore, the activities being regulated by the CSRA and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act are similarly commercial. See supra part V.A.
270. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 5 (referring to the General Accounting
Office study reporting that more than half of custodial parents in interstate cases did
not receive full support payments); see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
271. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 5; see supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
272. Legislative History, supra note 5, at 6.
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respect to a child who resides in another State" shall be subject to pros-
ecution.273 The requirement of diversity between noncustodial parent
and child provides a jurisdictional element which ensures that the Act
will be invoked only in interstate cases.274 As noted in Murphy,
CSRA prosecutions always involve financial transactions or obliga-
tions to individuals in two states.275 Thus, built into the statute is an
implicit prerequisite that a monetary obligation occur across state
lines.2 76
The Court in Lopez held that the GFSZA lacked an "express juris-
dictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of fire-
arm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce."277 The jurisdictional element of the
CSRA, therefore, distinguishes it from the statute struck down in
Lopez.
This jurisdictional element, however, is problematic in some re-
spects. The court in Schroeder discounted the jurisdictional element
of the CSRA, holding that the requirement that the delinquent parent
and the child live in different states is not sufficient to establish a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce. 278 The court held that be-
cause the government did not have to prove intent to flee as an
element of the crime, CSRA prosecution would be possible when the
custodial parent, rather than the delinquent parent, changed states.279
Thus, the court found that "[t]he nexus of requiring the non-paying
parent and the child to live in different states goes beyond those cases
the CSRA was aimed to address, namely parents who flee a state in an
attempt to avoid child support payment."'2 0
The bedrock purpose of the CSRA, however, is to deter the non-
payment of support. From a public policy perspective, criminal penal-
ties against a deadbeat parent often are justified in situations where
the deadbeat parent does not flee to another state. The custodial par-
ent who moves from one state to another for fear that either she or
her children will be harmed by the noncustodial parent, for example,
should not be precluded from utilizing the CSRA. Moreover, even if
more individuals fall within the purview of the CSRA than would be
necessary for the legislation to serve the more limited goal of prose-
273. 18 U.S.C § 228(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
274. See United States v. Sage, No. 3:95CR108 (DJS), 1995 WVL 627950, at *5 (D.
Conn. Oct. 3, 1995); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995); United States v.
Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D. Kan. 1995).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
276. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
277. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
279. See supra text accompanying note 190.
280. United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 1995).
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cuting fleeing parents, each application of the Act nonetheless would
involve a monetary transaction or obligation across state lines.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the CSRA to alleviate some of the enormous ob-
stacles to collecting an interstate child support award. Although the
constitutionality of the Act has been challenged since the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Lopez, three elements of child support
collection and the CSRA distinguish it from gun possession and the
GFSZA: (1) the payment of child support is more of a "commercial"
activity than is the possession of a gun; (2) congressional reports are
replete with references concerning the obstacles faced in the enforce-
ment of an interstate child support award, whereas legislative findings
did not accompany the GFSZA; and (3) the CSRA has a jurisdictional
element which necessitates an interstate transaction, whereas gun pos-
session may be wholly intrastate.
The very lack of these three elements-no "commercial" activity,
no congressional findings, and no jurisdictional element-seemed to
drive the Lopez decision. Inasmuch as the CSRA may be distin-
guished in each of these three areas from the GFSZA, the CSRA is a
valid exercise of Congress's commerce power.
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